Abstract. We present a powerful quasi-probabilistic default formalism for graded defaults based on a well-motivated canonical ranking construction procedure, System JLZ. It implements the minimal construction paradigm and verifies the major inference principles and inheritance desiderata, including rational monotony for propositions and structured cumulativity for default conditionals. With help from a structured ranking semantics for defaults, it also avoids some drawbacks of semi-qualitative entropy maximization and other competing accounts.
Introduction
Among the most promising areas in default reasoning are semantic-based conditional approaches. Their popularity is based less on historical accidents than on reasonable properties and conceptual transparency. In fact, they may be seen as providing a qualitative counterpart to inductive probabilistic reasoning. As in the probabilistic community (see Kolmogorov axioms), there is a broad consensus about the correct model-theoretic semantics for default conditionals, i.e. the monotonic logic. However, the semantic foundations for default inference, i.e. the nonmonotonic logic, are much more controversial.
The simplest and most prominent conditional default formalism of acceptable strength is System Z [Pearl 90], or equivalently rational closure [Lehmann, Magidor 92] , which implements the normality maximization paradigm [Weydert 93, 96] . It interprets defaults as constraints on plausibility rankings or orderings and picks up the one which makes the worlds the most plausible. This procedure is theoretically appealing and quite successful, e.g. for handling defeasible specificity, but it still fails to validate many desirable inference patterns, in particular inheritance to exceptional subpropositions. There have been different proposals trying to overcome the problems of System Z. On one hand, we have conditional approaches based on sophisticated prioritization strategies. This includes purely qualitative accounts, like conditional entailment [Geffner, Pearl 92] , and These problems have motivated us to propose a natural, constructive de facto counterpart of ME within the ranking measure framework which combines a canonical Z-like construction methodology with ME-inspired quasi-probabilistic justifications, System JZ [Weydert 98 ]. This powerful default inference notion has very nice properties, including rational monotony and common inheritance desiderata, but it also exhibits at least one major drawback, its excessive dependence on the structure of the default knowledge base. Although we have shown that it is necessary to take into account some structural information to ensure representation independence and inheritance to exceptional subpropositions, a problem which haunts ME-entailment as well, the question is whether we can do better than System JZ. In fact, we can! The goal of the present paper is to explain how to achieve this. More precisely, we are going to propose a new canonical ranking construction procedure whose default entailment product, System JLZ, shares all the major features of System JZ but offers better logical invariance properties. In particular, it verifies a cumulativity principle for default conditionals.
The roadmap is as follows. First, we recall the monotonic κπ-measure semantics for graded default conditionals in some detail. After presenting a number of relevant inference desiderata for default reasoning and a discussion of the exceptional inheritance paradox, we introduce our nonmonotonic ranking choice semantics. Exploiting Spohn's revision strategy for κπ-measures, we describe the minimal epistemic construction paradigm for default inference and its weakest instance, System J. This approach also suggests a new structured default semantics allowing us to deal with the inheritance paradox. Next we discuss some intuitive guidelines for canonical κπ-measure constructions, which motivate our JLZ-construction algorithm and the resulting default entailment notion, System JLZ. To understand and evaluate the procedure, we apply System JLZ to a number of old and new examples, and we compare it with System JZ. In addition, we prove some important inferential features, including a form of conditional cumulativity. To conclude, we take a look at its relation with ME-based default inference and other competing proposals.
Ranking measure semantics
We begin with a description of our basic logical framework. Let L be a language of propositional logic with an infinite set of propositional variables, W the corresponding set of L-structures, i.e. propositional valuations, and |= ⊆ W ×L the standard satisfaction relation. (L, |=) specifies our classical background logic. • L(⇒) = {ϕ ⇒ s ψ | s ∈]0, ∞] rat , ϕ, ψ ∈ L}.
The conditional ϕ ⇒ s ψ is meant to express that, given only ϕ, the degree of plausibility of ψ is at least s, or that ϕ plausibly/normally implies ψ with strength s. By default, we assume strength 1, which is why we abbreviate ⇒ 1 by ⇒. We interpret these binary connectives within a quasi-probabilistic semantic framework based on ranking measures [Weydert 91, 94] . These are epistemic valuations used to indicate the (relative) degree of surprise -or implausibility, disbelief, exceptionality -of propositions, picking up their values from a suitable linearly ordered additive scale structure. This algebraic approach offers reasonable notions of conditionalization and independence, which also paves the way to well-behaved semi-qualitative belief networks. We start with the most general definition implementing these demands. (1) reflects the needs of the propositional background language, (2) is necessary for a natural independence concept, (3) ensures normalization, (4) implements the semi-qualitative character, and (5) guarantees that ∞ marks proper impossibility. Of course, the commitment to a linear valuation range simplifies decisiontheoretic considerations. It is also less demanding in our coarse-grained context because each B admits a canonical uniform valuation, namely R 0 . Furthermore, we can represent partial plausibility orderings by sets of ranking measures. We do not ask for continuity because we may want to model situations where infinitely many disjoint events are considered actually and equally implausible. This allows us to avoid the infinitary lottery paradox expressible in first-order languages with default quantifiers.
Ranking measures bridge the gap between the sophisticated but cumbersome probabilistic perspective and the practical but simple-minded preference-based view to offer a powerful semi-qualitative semantics for defaults and belief. They are well-behaved instances of plausibility measures [Friedman, Halpern 01] and generalize Spohn's natural conditional functions [Spohn 90 ], known as κ-functions.
On the other hand, they do not encompass Spohn's ordinal conditional functions, whose valuation algebras fail to be commutative [Spohn 88 ]. Spohn introduced these notions to model iterated revision of graded full belief whereas Pearl popularized them in default reasoning [Pearl 90, Goldszmidt, Pearl 96] . κ-functions are ranking measures with positive integer values and verifying continuity. However, as we are going to see, if we want to model more sophisticated default entailment strategies, including entropy maximization at the ranking level, we need at least non-integer rational values. To meet these requirements, we strengthen the ranking measure concept and impose divisibility.
Definition 2.2 (κπ-measures)
A κπ-measure is a ranking measure R : B → V where V is divisible. That is, for all 0 < n ∈ N at and x ∈ V, there is y ∈ V with x = y + . . . + y (n times). V is called a κπ-algebra.
Because each ranking algebra V admits a minimal divisible extension, we may focus on κπ-measures. Although there exist infinitely many non-isomorphic κπ-algebras, they all share the same first-order theory. The standard examples are rational-and real-valued ranking measures. In fact, rational κπ-measures are sufficient for most purposes. Their κπ-algebra is not only the smallest possible one, it is also homogeneous in the sense that we can always exchange v, w = 0, ∞ by an automorphism on V. In fact, this entails divisibility (but the converse fails). Although ranking values admit a subjective epistemic interpretation [Spohn 99] , it is hard to imagine an absolute objective meaning comparable to the relative frequency reading of probabilities. Accordingly, structural distinctions between non-extreme ranks may be undesirable, i.e. homogeneity appears to be a rather natural feature.
The quasi-probabilistic character of this framework becomes even more obvious when we consider the close links between κπ-measures and nonarchimedean probability measures, i.e. extended probability valuations P whose valuation algebras are real-closed ordered fields with infinitesimal values ε. Given such a P over a compact B, we can define a corresponding κπ-measure R P by exploiting the order-of-magnitude perspective. Let ε be an arbitrary but fixed infinitesimal and re(x) be the standard part of x, i.e. the closest real if x is finite, else ∞.
• R P (A) = re(log ε (P (A))).
For instance, if P (A) = 0.1ε r−0.2 + 7ε r+0.5 , then R P (A) = r − 0.2. In other words, real κπ-ranks may be interpreted as order of magnitude probabilities. This relationship allows us to transfer relevant probabilistic techniques into the ranking world and to exploit the conceptual and technical tool set of probability theory. Ranking measures can avoid some limitations of standard resp. nonstandard probability, like the impossibility to condition on negligible events or to model revisable full belief, resp. the infinitesimal numerical precision overhead. In fact, they give us a kind of semi-qualitative testbed for probabilistic methodologies.
There are also obvious structural similarities between κπ-measures and possibility functions, another popular valuation concept applied to default reasoning and belief modeling [Dubois, Prade 98] . In fact, possibility measures π whose range is the real unit interval and which rely on multiplicative conditioning are isomorphic to continuous real-valued κπ-measures R π , just set R π = −log 2 • π. However, there are several reasons why we prefer the ranking perspective. Technically, the κπ-measure framework has a broader scope, which is for instance necessary to adequately handle first-order default quantification. Historically, our work stands more in the tradition of Spohn's κ-calculus, in particular because we exploit his static and dynamic epistemology. Conceptually, κπ-measures are meant to describe uncertainty, not imprecision. This contrasts with the fuzzy-theoretic roots of possibility theory, as illustrated by some early ambiguities w.r.t. the correct notion of conditioning. Didactically, we want to avoid fuzzy-theoretic connotations as well as a possible confusion with probability values. Practically, like other logarithmic approaches, κπ-measures are often easier to handle. Whereas we may well restrict ourselves to rational ranking values, rational-valued possibility measures fail to be κπ-measures because the rationals are not closed under roots. But whatever approach we prefer, it is important to take into account not only the superficial formal characteristics but also the whole accompanying conceptual framework, to guide interpretations as well as extensions and revisions.
κπ-measures R : B L → V provide a natural semantics for graded default conditionals over L (w.l.o.g. [0, ∞] rat ⊆ V ). In fact, we are going to present two satisfaction relations, one which ignores and one which exploits the strength parameter. Let us abbreviate R([ϕ]) by R(ϕ).
Definition 2.3 (κπ-measure semantics)
The satisfaction relations |= 0 κπ and |= κπ between κπ-measures and L(⇒)-formulas are as follows.
• Weak:
The monotonic entailment relation κπ is given by
For finite ∆, the monotonic entailment concept is independent from the choice of V, which also holds for the default inference notions we are going to discuss. But there are other nonmonotonic entailment strategies where the κπ-algebra becomes relevant.
Although the interpretation of defaults as ranking constraints is a powerful, popular, and intuitively appealing semantic perspective, we shall see that it doesn't yet fully grasp the nature of defaults. In fact, it turns out that there are plausible defeasible reasoning patterns whose semantic realization requires a more sophisticated model concept.
Default entailment
The task of default inference relations |∼ is to derive plausible consequences ψ ∈ L from specific facts, e.g. Σ ⊆ L, and generic default implications/rules expressing normal or plausible expectations, e.g. ∆ ⊆ L(⇒). Curiously, most investigations have focused on |∼ ∆ , where ∆ is kept fixed.
•
It is important to note -especially given some unfortunate notational traditions -that here we have to deal with two types of conditional concepts, on one hand the individual defaults ϕ ⇒ ψ at the oject-level (e.g. Reiter-style normal default rules), and on the other hand the defeasible inferential relationships Σ |∼ ∆ ψ at the meta-level (e.g. skeptical Reiter-style inference). If Σ is finite and |∼ ∆ verifies left logical equivalence, we may restrict ourselves to σ |∼ ∆ ψ, for σ = Σ (sloppily dropping the premise set parentheses). We emphasize that the meaning and the logical characteristics of the original defaults ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ ∆ can be radically different from those of the resulting consequential links ϕ |∼ ∆ ψ, as illustrated by Reiter's default logic. Surprisingly, the dichotomy between such input-and output conditionals also arises for well-behaved conditional approaches.
On an abstract level, we are now going to present a number of desirable principles for default inference, especially within the κπ-semantic framework. In the following, let Σ ∪ ∆ be finite, a monotonic conditional logic (not necessarily κπ ), and Cn(∆) = {δ ∈ L(⇒) | ∆ δ}.
Strong defeasible modus ponens (DMP)
This principle establishes a fundamental link between the object-level default conditionals and the defeasible inference relation. It is nontrivial insofar as, for instance, Reiter's default logic fails to verify DMP even for consistent ϕ, ψ and ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ ∆. In particular,
• {ϕ} ∪ {ϕ : ψ/ψ, T : ¬ψ/¬ψ} |∼ ψ.
If we reject syntax-dependence, the next requirement is a conditio sine qua non.
Local logical invariance w.r.t. (LLI )
Surprisingly, we will see that the global version of this principle, left logical equivalence for defaults w.r.t. a decent , is incompatible with natural inheritance patterns. The problem is that the structure of ∆, i.e. the choice of defaults, may implicitly encode relevant independence assumptions exploitable in default reasoning.
Global logical invariance w.r.t. (GLI )
The impact of the above principles depends of course on the strength of . We can trivially enforce them by weakening . Consider for instance the rudimentary inference notion 0 (equivalent inclusion) given by
Here LLI w.r.t. 0 entails GLI w.r.t. 0 . The next two conditions concern the proper behaviour of |∼ ∆ and are inspired from Lehmann's popular rationality postulates [Kraus et al. 90] .
Logicality (LOG)
• |∼ ∆ satisfies the basic KLM-postulates (w.r.t. cl ), namely supraclassicality, left logical equivalence, right weakening and right conjunction.
Logicality is verified by most default formalisms, including Reiter's default logic. But this is no longer true for two other desiderata, namely cumulativity (CUM) and left disjunction or reasoning by cases (OR). Together with logicality, they characterize preferential consequence relations, i.e. those definable by a preferred model semantics w.r.t. a pre-order (with limit evaluation we do not need the smoothness condition [Boutilier 94] ).
Preferentiality (PREF)
• |∼ ∆ is a preferential consequence relation (i.e. LOG+CUM+OR).
A more controversial strengthening would be rational monotony (RM), a defensible but rather speculative principle [Lehmann, Magidor 92] . It amounts to assume the existence of a total pre-order semantics.
Rationality (RAT)
• |∼ ∆ is a rational consequence relation (i.e. PREF+RM).
If ∆ does not enforce the impossibility of ϕ, i.e. ∆ ϕ ⇒ s F, open-mindedness suggests that in the context of ∆, ϕ shouldn't plausibly infer a contradiction. On the other hand, if ∆ ϕ ⇒ s F, DMP requires ϕ |∼ ∆ F, even for consistent ∆. Therefore, we propose the following version of consistency preservation.
Consistency preservation (CP)
The above conditions may be reasonable, even necessary, but they are still far from being sufficient. For instance, System P, a notoriously weak approach violating e.g. defeasible specificity, only fails to verify RM (for = κπ ). It can be specified as follows.
The next two requirements, which directly refer to the fine-structure of the default knowledge base, are much more substantial. They have been inspired by similar considerations in the context of inductive probabilistic reasoning [Halpern, Koller 95] . The first principle, strong irrelevance, states that the inferential behaviour should not be affected by irrelevant information expressed in an independent language fragment. It turns out to be particularly demanding for semantic-based approaches. In particular, it fails for the popular System Z [Pearl 90].
Another very natural postulate is representation independence, which assumes invariance under partial boolean isomorphisms within B = B L .
Representation independence (RI)
Let π : B 1 → B 2 ⊆ B be an isomorphism between two boolean subsystems B 1 , B 2 ⊆ B, and π : L → L be a compatible syntactic map with
Although the above list certainly does not include or determine all the potentially desirable inference patterns, it nevertheless offers useful intuitive guidelines for evaluating, classifying, and developing default formalisms. A derivable classical desideratum is inheritance to exceptional subpropositions.
Exceptional inheritance (EI)
If the L-formulas ψ, ψ are logically independent given ϕ,
However, local features like this one tend to be of limited practical value because default inference is typically nonmonotonic w.r.t. ∆, i.e. the addition of further defaults may easily defeat them.
Theorem 3.1 (Exceptional inheritance) EI follows from DMP, LOG, LLI w.r.t. 0 , RI, and IRR.
Proof: Let v, w be two different propositional variables. From DMP we know that {T ⇒ w} |∼ w. IRR then gives us {¬v} ∪ {T ⇒ v, T ⇒ w} |∼ w. It now directly follows from RI that for logically independent ψ, ψ ∈ L, {¬ψ} ∪ {T ⇒ ψ, T ⇒ ψ } |∼ ψ . If ψ, ψ are logically independent within ϕ, a further application of RI gives us {ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} ∪ {ϕ ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ } |∼ ϕ ∧ ψ . Using logicality and LLI w.r.t. 0 , we can then derive {ϕ, ¬ψ}∪{ϕ ⇒ ψ, ϕ ⇒ ψ } |∼ ψ .
QED.
Exceptional inheritance is a very plausible inference pattern. However, this principle is less innocent than it looks. Although it doesn't cause problems for most traditional consistency-based default formalisms, like Reiter's default logic, it turns out to be a showstopper for naive semantic-based conditional approaches to default reasoning, as we have already observed on earlier occasions [Weydert 98 ]. Let us reconsider the corresponding impossibility result in the present context.
Theorem 3.2 (Exceptional inheritance paradox)
Let |∼ be a default inference notion over L(⇒) verifying LOG, EI, and GLI w.r.t. 1 , a conditional logic satisfying logicality at the object-level, i.e. for ⇒. Then, for logically independent consistent ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
Proof: EI immediately gives us
If ψ, ψ are logically independent, then so are ψ and ψ ↔ ψ . Therefore,
It then follows from GLI w.r.t. 1 that these sets have the same defeasible consequences, in particular ψ and ψ ↔ ψ . But LOG also gives us ¬ψ and therefore
With IRR and RI, we would even get {¬ψ} ∪ {T ⇒ ψ} |∼ F. QED. This is of course completely inacceptable because it trivializes plausible inference from exceptional premises even in the context of consistent default bases without strict knowledge.
If we want to save the intuitions and intentions of default reasoning, we have to give up either LOG, EI, or GLI w.r.t. modestly strong conditional logics. However, from our qualitative, semantic perspective, LOG is absolutely basic and cannot be dropped. Consequently, if we want to keep EI, we have to reject the more powerful instances of GLI. It follows that, by itself, the κπ-semantics is unable to fully grasp the intuitive content of default knowledge bases. The interesting question is now whether there is a suitable alternative model concept backing GLI w.r.t. the corresponding monotonic entailment notion, as well as other relevant principles.
Our semantic framework for default reasoning is based on ranking choice functions. Their role is to associate with each finite default base ∆ a set of distinguished κπ-models F(∆) ⊆ M od κπ (∆) determining the plausible inferences admissible in the context of ∆. There are only two conditions we want to impose. First of all, any semantic approach deserving this title should be invariant under the substitution of κπ-semantically equivalent defaults (local semanticality) to guarantee LLI w.r.t. κπ . It follows from our previous considerations that the exchange of entire κπ-semantically equivalent default bases is too disruptive and cannot be universally required (no global semanticality). Secondly, consistent default premises should never sanction an inconsistency, i.e. they should always admit at least one distinguished κπ-model. Because we are only going to consider finite default sets, we can and will restrict ourselves to real-valued κπ-measures and interpret M od κπ (∆) accordingly , with V = [0, ∞]. In fact, to specify our default entailment notions, the rational κπ-algebra would be enough.
Definition 3.3 (Ranking choice) F is a ranking choice function iff for each finite ∆ ⊆ L(⇒),
Definition 3.4 (Default ranking entailment) Let F be a ranking choice function. Then
This approach appears to be natural, flexible, and general. For instance, it is easy to see that an inference notion |∼ is preferential (for any finite ∆) iff there is a ranking choice function F with |∼ = |∼ F . In particular, the weakest variant F(∆) = M od κπ (∆) corresponds to System P. Of course, this means that default ranking entailment relations may fail to support basic desiderata like defeasible chaining or irrelevance reasoning. But we get at least the following. Proof: Immediate from the definitions. QED.
As a first illustration, let us implement the well-known normality maximization (or surprise minimization) paradigm within this framework. If ∆ is consistent, this ranking choice is canonical and given by
If we assume default strength 1 for non-parametrized conditionals, and ∆ ϕ ⇒ F for consistent ϕ, we have |∼
It follows from the definition that |∼ N M = |∼ F N M also validates RI, CP and GLI w.r.t. κπ , and therefore violates IRR and EI.
Construction entailment
The conflict between global κπ-logical invariance and other reasonable inference principles, as disclosed by the exceptional inheritance paradox, tells us that the intended content of a default set ∆ cannot always be fully characterized by its κπ-model set M od κπ (∆). The inner structure of ∆, the choice of a specific set of defaults inducing κπ-measure constraints may carry additional, implicit information which we want to exploit. In fact, we may interpret defaults as individual evidence items, not only guiding plausible inference but also reflecting the epistemic processes (e.g. iterated revision steps) forming the belief states described by the default sets. This is the basic idea behind the epistemic construction paradigm [Weydert 95a, 96, 98] , which turns out to be a powerful strategy for specifying default inference notions.
Epistemic construction philosophy.
Prefer those models of ∆ accessible from the ignorant prior by suitable iterated revision sequences with evidence from P rop(
To implement this approach within the κπ-framework, we have to explore its epistemic dimension. Following Spohn's perspective [Spohn 88, 90] , κπ-measures -mirroring subjective probability on a coarser-grained level -can be used for modeling epistemic states. The idea is to identify the belief strength Bel(ϕ) with the degree of surprise of [¬ϕ] , namely R(¬ϕ). That is, ϕ is believed iff R(¬ϕ) > 0, with strength s (at least) iff R(¬ϕ) ≥ s. This definition has the advantage that it supports full graded belief, i.e. quantified belief closed under conjunction, which is beyond the reach of standard probability theory.
Spohn has proposed a very popular iterated revision concept based on Jeffreyconditionalization at the ranking-level. Because we focus on consistent ∆, i.e. consistent P rop(∆), we only have to deal with iterated expansion, i.e. nonconflicting revision. To specify Spohn-type expansion for κπ-measures, we introduce an auxiliary notion, namely shifting.
Definition 4.1 (Shifting)
Shifting is a function with parameters A ∈ B and a ∈ [0, ∞] which maps a κπ-measure R to a κπ-measure R + aA s.t. for all B ∈ B,
Shifting a proposition A by the amount a means uniformly increasing the ranks of A-worlds -more precisely, of A-subpropositions -by a. Our parametrized consistent revision concept for κπ-measures slightly varies Spohn's proposal.
For non-conflicting evidence, minimal Spohn-type revision enforces a belief strength of at least a by shifting ¬A as far as necessary. This revision function is distinguished by the fact that its probabilistic counterpart minimizes the information gain.
The epistemic construction paradigm proposes to focus on those κπ-measures which result from iterated revision with [ϕ i → ψ i ] ∈ P rop(∆), starting at the uniform prior
. Every κπ-model R of ∆ represents a belief state which supports each [ϕ i → ψ i ] ∈ P rop(∆) with strength s i at least, i.e. R(ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ) ≥ s i > 0. In this context, we may interpret P rop(∆) as a set of explicit beliefs associated with the epistemic measure R. In fact, R(¬ψ) > 0 iff P rop(∆) ⊆ [ψ] . Concerning the dynamics, we assume that the explicit beliefs ϕ i → ψ i are added successively using suitable -possibly vanishing -strength parameters p i so as to let the resulting κπ-measure eventually validate ∆. To simplify notation, w.l.o.g., we take the indexing order to be the revision order. Formally speaking, R is accessible by iterated minimal Spohn-type revision with evidence from P rop(∆) iff there are p i ∈ [0, ∞] with
Accessibility is equivalent to epistemic constructibility, which is a bit easier to handle.
Definition 4.3 (Epistemic constructibility)
The κπ-measure R is constructible over
for some a i ∈ [0, ∞] (for convenience, we usually drop the prefix R 0 +). Let Constr(∆) be the set of real κπ-measures constructible over ∆ and
In practice this means imposing a context-dependent penalty for the violation of defaults and to construct a preferred κπ-measure by adding the penalties for each world and computing the ranks of propositions from their minimal elements. This paves the way for a whole class of well-behaved default inference relations.
Definition 4.4 (Constructible inference)
A default inference notion |∼ F is constructible (w.r.t. |= κπ ) iff
In [Weydert 96 ], we introduced constructible inference w.r.t. |= 0 κπ , i.e. for nonparametrized default conditionals. In particular, we investigated its weakest instance, System J, which is characterized by
In the context of constructible inference w.r.t. |= κπ , i.e. for graded defaults, the weakest notion is of course
However, it is not difficult to see that the resulting entailment relations |∼ J and |∼ F J are equivalent. Although this approach is very simple, it is nevertheless very powerful and validates many relevant inference desiderata. Proof: The only non-trivial ranking choice condition is nonmonotonic consistency. Let ∆ be as before with |∆| = n + 1 and
This construction also allows us to validate CP. DMP, LLI w.r.t. κπ , and PREF are direct consequences of the ranking choice definition. The semantic specification of System J immediately gives us RI. Because shiftable propositions from a logically independent language fragment cannot change the ranking values of the propositions from the original language (no subsumption of its non-empty propositions by any new one), IRR follows as well. QED.
There is a slightly stronger variant of System J, System J + , which shares its robustness and verifies the above principles as well.
• System J + :
System J + differs from its relative insofar as it enforces non-redundancy, that is, each default is explicitly taken into account through the strictly positive shifting weights. This is also a basic assumption in [Benferhat et al. 00] , which applies the belief function perspective to default reasoning. For instance,
However, this redundancy-ignorant behaviour conflicts with the information minimization paradigm, which is more in line with System J. Depending on whether we want to emphasize more the collective, constraint-oriented character of defaults, or the individual, evidence-oriented one, we may prefer either System J or System J + . In fact, all our default formalisms JX admit a natural strictly constructible variant JX + , i.e. enforcing a i > 0 for all shifting weights. However, this step is not entirely trivial because in general,
System J verifies the major inheritance patterns for default reasoning. In particular, EI follows from IRR and RI. For instance, given logically independent ψ, ψ ∈ L, we have
, which is enough to guarantee R(¬ψ |¬ψ) > 0. Hence,
It is easy to see that EI holds for every constructible inference notion |∼ F . This means of course that we have to reject GLI for non-rudimentary conditional logics. For instance, if ∆ = {T ⇒ ϕ, T ⇒ ψ} and
, which is in fact the minimal surprise model of ∆ and ∆ , is not constructible over ∆, and therefore
The interesting question is now how much of the structure of a default base we have to take into account to get back global invariance. Within our framework, it seems that we need at least P rop(∆), and at most M od sg κπ (∆). The strongest possible weakening of GLI is therefore Structured logical invariance (SLI)
• ∆ ∆ and P rop(∆) = P rop(∆ ) implies |∼ ∆ = |∼ ∆ .
The corresponding ranking choice principle is even stronger.
Structured semantic invariance (SSI)
Obviously, System J validates these invariance requirements, but there are also powerful constructible inference concepts which do not. These principles suggest an extension of our ranking-based default semantics. The idea is to consider what we call structured κπ-measures.
Definition 4.6 (Structured κπ-measures)
A structured κπ-measure is a pair (R, S) consisting of a κπ-measure R and a set of shiftable propositions
Definition 4.7 (Structured κπ-measure semantics)
The satisfaction relations |= sκπ , |= 0 sκπ for structured κπ-measures are given by
Let M od sκπ , M od 0 sκπ be the associated model set functions and sκπ , 0 sκπ the corresponding monotonic entailment relations.
From the definition it follows that
• (R, S) |= sκπ ∆ iff R |= κπ ∆ and Sh(∆) ⊆ S,
Let us now reconsider the EI example, where we get
Because one direction fails, the conflict between GLI w.r.t. sκπ and EI disappears. We may see structured κπ-entailment as a resource-restricted variant of the original conditional logic. In the following, we will exploit the usual semantic concepts |= κπ and κπ together with their stronger structural variants. We define the structured ranking choice concept by replacing the first condition with F(∆) ⊆ M od sκπ (∆). To implement parsimony, we could require that the second component of a distinguished structured κπ-model is just the collection of shiftable propositions.
• F(∆) = {(R, Sh(∆)) | (R, S) ∈ F(∆)}.
Thus, we have a one-to-one relationship between non-structured and parsimonously structured ranking choice functions.
Rational construction entailment
System J is certainly well-behaved, but its robustness goes hand in hand with a partly excessive cautiousness. To illustrate its limitations, we take a look at the "big birds hammer", an illuminating example about the flying abilities of different types of birds. The denotation reflects the difficulties to reach the preferred solution in the presence of exceptional inheritance, as documented by the failures of well-known powerful default formalisms.
Big Birds Hammer I Birds are normally small, birds can normally fly, exceptional birds -violating at least one of these assumptions -normally cannot fly. What may we then assume about the size of non-flying birds, or the flying abilities of big birds?
The corresponding default knowledge base, with b, s, f expressing for instance bird(Daisy), small(Daisy), canf ly(Daisy), is
We want to know whether {b, ¬f } |∼ ∆ s, or {b, ¬s} |∼ ∆ f . Our intuitions tend to reject the first pattern (b ⇒ s is redundant), but to accept the second one (counterevidence neutralized by specificity). This is also what System Z and ME (information minimization) would suggest. But whereas System J confirms the rejection,
it fails to support the plausible conclusion,
The problem is that System J leaves us with too many degrees of freedom. Let us therefore consider the other extreme, canonical ranking constructions, where a speculative ranking choice function picks up a single constructible κπ-model for each consistent ∆, i.e. F(∆) = {R ∆ } ⊆ F J (∆). In particular, we may try to find a suitable constructible counterpart of System Z which verifies all the relevant reasoning patterns and inference principles. How can we specify, in a natural way, for each consistent ∆ = {ϕ i ⇒ si ψ i | i ≤ n} a canonical most plausible constructible κπ-model? The strategy we are going to follow is to start from heuristic guidelines reflecting different faces of the minimal construction paradigm.
Minimal epistemic construction philosophy. Prefer those κπ-models requiring the least efforts to construct.
More precisely, we are going to consider comparison criteria for ranking constructions. These are partial propositional weight assignments and can be understood as a refinement of structured κπ-measures.
Definition 5.1 (Standard κπ-constructions)
A κπ-construction σ = {(A i , a i ) | i ≤ n} is a map from a finite collection of propositions A i ∈ B to shifting weights a i ∈ [0, ∞]. We set R σ = (R 0 +)Σ i≤n a i A i and S σ = {A i | i ≤ n} (sloppily using Σ i≤n a i A i to denote σ as well as R σ ).
In the following examples, we assume by default that a, b, ϕ, ψ, . . . are logically independent.
P1. Minimizing evidence.
Minimize the set of shiftable propositions S, i.e. restrict them to Sh(∆). This is a simple structural parsimony principle which is at the heart of constructible inference. For instance, in the context of ∆ = {T ⇒ a, T ⇒ b},
In fact, without this requirement, our approach would be indistinguishable from standard normality maximization, i.e. mishandle exceptional inheritance.
P2. Minimizing surprise.
Prefer κπ-constructions making more propositions less surprising. That is, minimize the set of shiftable propositions A arriving at any given rank s, i.e. with R σ (A) ≥ s, starting at the bottom and proceeding lexicographically.
This principle strengthens and adapts the normality maximization philosophy to the epistemic construction framework. The lexicographic strategy takes into account that making more plausible propositions more surprising has a higher informational impact than doing so for less plausible ones. 
P3. Minimizing shifting.
Minimize the length of shifting moves aimed at pushing propositions to a given rank, starting with the longest -i.e. costliest -ones, and proceed lexicographically. . Although both constructions give us R(a) = R(b) = R(a ∨ b) = 2, the second one uses longer shifting moves. This requirement implements the minimal effort philosophy locally. It assumes that the evaluation of efforts is best done relative to a specific task in a specific context, here w.r.t. to building up a particular ranking level. It also supports uniqueness, which would fail if we maximized the shorter moves. Pointwise, non-lexicographic shifting minimization also would be unable to guarantee canonicity. Consider for instance ∆ = {T ⇒ a ∧ b, T ⇒ a, T ⇒ b}.
|= κπ ∆ minimizes the shifting lengths. But the most natural solution here is of course the symmetric one.
Similar principles have also inspired System JZ [Weydert 98 ], until recently the only well-behaved canonical ranking construction strategy. However, its specification is strongly influenced by another important feature, namely justifiable constructibility.
P4. Justifiable constructibility (w.r.t. ∆).
The ranking construction should not include shifting moves which are unjustified or redundant w.r.t. the satisfaction of the ranking constraints ∆ induces. That is, if
only occur if there is no oversatisfaction, i.e. if we realize
We may illustrate justifiable constructibility with the following example.
The resulting constraints are 1 ≤ R(ϕ 1 ), 1 ≤ R(ϕ 2 ), 1 ≤ R(ψ), R(ψ) + 1 ≤ R(ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ), and Sh(
Because we necessarily have R(ϕ 1 ), R(ϕ 2 ) ≥ 2, the first two constraints cannot be realized as equalities, i.e. shifting [ϕ 1 ] or [ϕ 2 ] would always be redundant. But to satisfy the other two constraints, we have to shift [ψ] and [ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ], which imposes the equality constraints R(ψ) = 1 and R(ψ) + 1 = R(ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ). The unique justifiably constructible κπ-model of ∆ 1 is therefore 1[ψ]+2[ϕ 1 ∨ϕ 2 ], which is thereby also the canonical JZ-model. Note however that in general, justifiable constructibility does not enforce uniqueness. For instance, all the infinitely many κπ-models R σx |= κπ ∆ from the above example are justifiably constructible w.r.t. ∆.
Unfortunately, the logical invariance properties of System JZ are less appealing. Consider for instance
Here the corresponding constraints are 1
Using similar arguments as before, we can show that the only justifiably constructible κπ-model of ∆ 2 -and therefore its canonical JZ-model -is 1[ψ] + 2[ϕ 1 ] + 2[ϕ 2 ]. That is, ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 induce different JZ-models.
But their structured κπ-semantical content is identical.
That is, M od sκπ (∆ 1 ) = M od sκπ (∆ 2 ). It follows that default entailment notions verifying justifiable constructibility, and in particular System JZ, strongly depend on the inner structure of default bases and fail to validate structured invariance. This problem is also characteristic for ranking-based entailment notions exploiting entropy maximization because they typically verify justifiable constructibility. Consequently, there are good reasons to look for an alternative implementation of the above principles, ignoring justifiable constructibility.
System JLZ
We are now going to introduce System JLZ, a powerful new default inference notion which is based on a sophisticated but well-motivated canonical ranking construction procedure in the tradition of System Z. It implements the minimal shifting and the normality maximization philosophy, verifying the major inference desiderata while avoiding some weaknesses of System JZ.
We begin by introducing a few auxiliary concepts. The first one, relative normality maximization, is an important tool for ensuring minimal surprise at each construction step. Let us call a κπ-measure R compatible with a default base ∆ iff ∆ doesn't contradict any belief from R, i.e. if there is no ϕ ∈ L with R |= 0 κπ T ⇒ ϕ and ∆ 0 κπ T ⇒ ¬ϕ. This means that we can realize the epistemic constraints resulting from ∆ by strengthening and expanding the beliefs supported by R. Let R ≤ R iff R(A) ≤ R (A) for all A ∈ B.
Definition 6.1 (Relative normality maximization) If R is compatible with ∆, the relative normality maximization model of ∆ over R exists and is given by
NM[R, ∆] is the unique least surprising model of ∆ above R. If ∆ is finite and R rational-valued, then so is NM[R, ∆]. Next we introduce some technical notions to evaluate the local shifting efforts. We start by encoding our lexicographic preference -not for more shorter but -for less longer shifts. Let x = (x i | i ≤ m) and y = (y i | i ≤ m) be tuples from [0, ∞] representing construction moves. Let J r z = {j | z j = r}.
Definition 6.2 (Shifting effort comparison)
The construction move x is preferred to (requires less effort than) y iff E.g., we get (2, 5, 3, 2, 2) ≺ lsh (3, 5, 3, 1, 0) because ({1}, {2}, {0, 3, 4}, ∅, ∅) ⊂ lex ({1}, {0, 2}, ∅, {3}, {4}), the tuples corresponding to (J Definition 6.3 (Lexicographic shifting minimization) Σ i≤m a i A i is shifting minimal w.r.t. reaching rank α from R iff
This also maximizes the local uniformity of shifting lengths by pushing down the peaks. A major advantage is the existence of unique minima, which helps us to specify a canonical construction.
Theorem 6.4 (Canonical local shifting minima)
Given R, A i , α as above, there is a unique ≺ lsh -minimum a.
Proof: It is a simple combinatorial exercise to compute the smallest shifting length s max ≥ 0 with ∀j ≤ m(R + Σ i≤m s max A i )(A j ) ≥ α. For those A j with (R + Σ i≤m s max A i )(A j ) = α, we set a j = s max and collect the corresponding indices j in J. If {i | i ≤ m} − J = ∅, we repeat the same procedure with R + Σ j∈J s max A j and {A i | i ∈ J}, which gives us s max < s max and J ⊆ {i | i ≤ m} − J. We iterate this step until no more A i are left. Note that a fixed A j with rank α cannot be covered by non-fixed A i with current rank > α, which guarantees its stability. In other words, we start from a j = s max for j ≤ m and uniformly decrease the a j until (R + Σ i≤m a i A i )(A j ) = α or a j = 0. The construction ensures that the resulting a is the ≺ lsh -minimum. QED.
We are now ready to specify the JLZ-construction for any consistent finite ∆ ⊆ L(⇒). Our approach is based on an inductive bottom-up procedure starting at the uniform prior R 0 and proceeding from less surprising to more surprising levels. More specifically, we construct our distinguished κπ-model rank by rank, trying to approximate normality maximization while minimizing the shifting efforts at each rank. To achieve this, we are going to build two increasing sequences of rational κπ-measures (R i ) i≤h and (R * i ) i≤h , with
, and R i ≤ R * i , which will eventually converge to a single preferred constructible κπ-model R h = R * h of ∆, which we denote by JLZ [∆] .
The major players of this incremental approach are
• R j : κπ-measure resulting from the current partial ranking construction,
• r j : current target rank,
• I : index set of Sh(∆), i.e. {0, . . . , n},
• I j : index set of the shiftable propositions considered at step j,
• I j : index set of the shiftable propositions fixed to rank r j at step j.
The specification of the construction algorithm is now very simple.
JLZ-procedure: How to construct JLZ[∆] for consistent ∆.
Induction begin: j = 0
• r 0 = 0,
Induction step: j → j + 1
• r j+1 smallest r > r j of the form r = R * j (ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ), 
Induction stop: j = h
The first question is whether this algorithm really does what we expect it to do.
Theorem 6.5 (Existence and correctness)
If ∆ is consistent, the JLZ-construction terminates and JLZ[∆] |= κπ ∆.
Proof: The definition of R j and the consistency of ∆ guarantee their compatibility, i.e. the existence of R * j . The specification of r j and the monotonic increase of the R * j entails that I 0 ∪ . . . ∪ I j includes all those i with R * j (ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ) ≤ r j . Therefore, r j+1 exists as long as I 0 ∪ . . . ∪ I j = I (we have = if r j = ∞). It follows from the construction that I 0 ∪ . . . ∪ I j = I implies I j+1 = ∅ and I j+1 = ∅. Hence, because ∆ is finite, the procedure will eventually stop.
The specific rank-wise approach ensures that R j (A) = R *
values cannot be affected by shifts at later stages. That is, for
It is now easy to see that the map F JLZ , given by
is a ranking choice function which defines a rational constructible default entailment notion, System JLZ.
• System JLZ:
To illustrate the nature of JLZ-entailment, we reconsider the example documenting problems with justifiable constructibility, also affecting our old flagship System JZ.
First, let us have a look at the JLZ-construction for ∆ 1 . For convenience, we are going to use the constructive notation Σa i A i also to describe κπ-measures not constructible over ∆ 1 , e.g. the relative minimal surprise models R * j . Because each default has a different exceptional part, we may identify the sets of indices with the corresponding default sets.
• s 1 = 1, I 1 : {T ⇒ ¬ψ},
Replacing I 2 by {T ⇒ ¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 , ψ ∨ ϕ 1 ⇒ ¬ϕ 1 , ψ ∨ ϕ 2 ⇒ ¬ϕ 2 }, the same construction also gives us the JLZ-model of ∆ 2 .
Although the JZ-construction process has a similar flavour, the JLZ-solution is different from JZ[∆ 1 ] and JZ[∆ 2 ]. The reason for this divergence is the more extensive exploitation of defaults by System JLZ. For instance, suppose a proposition to be shifted towards rank r is pushed strictly above r by side-effects from other shifting moves directed at r. Then System JZ simply ignores the shiftable proposition corresponding to the redundant constraint whereas System JLZ may take it into account at a later stage. More specifically, when we construct the JZ-resp. JLZ-model of ∆ 1 , [ϕ 1 ] and [ϕ 2 ] are aimed at rank 1, but because of ψ ∨ ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ⇒ ¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 , they are automatically pushed to rank 2 > 1. Consequently, following justifiable constructibility, System JZ sets their shifting coefficients to 0. On the other hand, System JLZ exploits them together with ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 to build up rank 2.
The difference between JLZ and JZ is that JLZ puts the overachievers back into the basket whereas JZ stipulates I j = I j , which amounts to drop them. Thus, System JLZ also minimizes shifting in the sense that it distributes the shifting load among more shiftable propositions, including those remaining from earlier stages. It follows that JZ and JLZ are equivalent if all the defaults have Z-level 1, i.e. if there are no exceptions of exceptions.
There is another interesting example exposing some relevant choices for canonical ranking constructions.
• Dominance The JLZ-construction now puts the first three propositions into I 1 , but only the first two into I 1 , because shifting them to rank 1 imposes at least rank 2 for the third one (in the context of the last two). Therefore, I 2 includes the last three. The resulting JLZ-construction is
whereas the JZ-construction, keeping the third one passive, gives us
We may note that the alternative
would conflict with the minimal shifting philosophy. Another interesting observation is that naive normality maximization may conflict with local shifting minimization. Consider for instance the following example.
• ∆ = {T ⇒ ¬p, T ⇒ ¬q, T ⇒ q → p}.
is the minimal surprise model NM[R 0 , ∆], which is also constructible over ∆. Roughly speaking, we may say that shifting minimization dominates within levels whereas normality maximization dominates between them.
To illustrate the features and peculiarities of System JLZ, and of constructionbased default reasoning in general, we are now going to take a look at some examples, including classical and fresh benchmark patterns. Of course, the validation of specific desiderata by itself is not sufficient to justify default formalisms, although their violation may well suggest a rejection or modifications. In fact, examples can be highly misleading if their scenarios exploit implicit world knowledge which has not been explicitly represented and may vary among users. That's why we offer interpretations mainly for historical and didactical reasons. But independently from their intuitive desirability, these reasoning patterns help us to compare and position different approaches, to get an idea of their strengths and weaknesses, and to focus our research efforts, e.g. when seeking solid semantic foundations. However, first of all, we want to get a feeling of how System JLZ works. Being lazy, we don't give all the details, so the reader is invited to try out some of these examples him/herself.
For each default scheme, we specify the -possibly -expected inferential relationship Σ ∪ ∆ |∼ ψ or Σ ∪ ∆ |∼ ψ, the canonical JLZ-model JLZ[∆] = Σ i a i A i , and the ranks r i = JLZ[∆](A i ) of the shiftable propositions A i . By default we assume that the propositional variables are logically independent. To honour the tradition, we sometimes offer a folkloristic reading. "v: property p" indicates that the proposition v is meant to express that an unspecified but fixed entity x has property p. Approximately two thirds of the examples are inspired from the literature. We apologize for not having tried to pin down the original authors. Let us start with two inheritance classics (⇒ abbreviates ⇒ 1 ).
Defeasible specificity (s: student, a: adult, m: married)
• {s, a} ∪ {s ⇒ a, a ⇒ m, s ⇒ ¬m} |∼ ¬m
Blocking inheritance (p: penguin, b: bird, f: can-fly, w: has-wings)
Nested crossing demonstrates the need for rational ranks, e.g. R(s∧a∧b) = 3/2.
Redundancy reflects the minimal information stance by default subsumption.
Redundancy (b: bird, f: can-fly, w: has-wings)
Inheritance may be blocked by adding κπ-derivable conditionals with different exception areas.
Conditional consequence
Ambiguity is not affected by making an alternative exceptional.
Asymmetric ambiguity
• {p, q} ∪ {p ⇒ ¬a, q ⇒ a, T ⇒ ¬q} |∼ a, ¬a (i.e. |∼ a, |∼ ¬a)
A classical example against rational monotony doesn't work here.
Ambiguity preservation (p: penguin, b: bird, f: can-fly, m: metal-wings)
The weight of independent reasons is taken into account.
Evidence comparison
The degree of specificity can influence the weight of reasons.
Specificity weight
Because the conditional a ⇒ r is redundant, the traditional argument against cumulativity for inheritance links fails.
Redundant shortcut (s: student, a: adult, m: married, r: responsible)
• {s} ∪ {s ⇒ a, a ⇒ m, s ⇒ ¬m, a ⇒ r, m ⇒ r} |∼ r, ¬r
The following BBH variant exemplifies almost redundancy.
Big birds hammer II (b: bird, s: small, f: can-fly)
The entanglement of BBH scenarios slightly complicates the JLZ-construction.
Big birds runner (b: bird, s: small, w: swimmer, r: runner)
The next two examples address the relationships between different types of double exceptionality.
Anti-prioritization
• {a∨(p∧q)}∪{T ⇒ ¬p, T ⇒ ¬q, (a∨p) ⇒ ¬a, (a∨q) ⇒ ¬a} |∼ ¬a, ¬(p∧q)
Exception analogies
Although specificity-inheritance is usually taken for granted, it is important to note that its naive interpretation may fail in complexer contexts.
Complex specificity I
Complex specificity II
Because of the non-causal reading, defeasible chaining can be blocked by counterevidence ahead.
No forward chaining (s: student, a: adult, m: married, r: responsible)
All the negative patterns are of course also valid for System J, as are most of the positive inferences. Within the constructible framework, the discriminatory power of many examples is therefore rather low. What makes System JLZ particularly interesting is that it verifies these individual default schemes in addition to relevant global inference principles, like rational monotony or suitable invariance features.
Some properties
JLZ-entailment validates the major classical inference desiderata, as well as some new ones.
Theorem 8.1 (Basic properties) System JLZ verifies DMP, LLI w.r.t. κπ , PREF, IRR, RM, CP, RI, and SSI.
Proof: The first four principles hold for any constructible default inference notion. Rational monotony follows from canonicity. Because the JLZ-construction gets its shifting targets from normality maximization and minimizes its shifting moves, JLZ[∆](ϕ) = ∞ is only possible if ∆ ϕ ⇒ s F, which sanctions CP. The semantic character of the world set shifting procedure guarantees RI. Because the JLZ-algorithm only depends on M od κπ (∆) -for relative normality maximization -and Sh(∆) -for the shiftable parts -SSI immediately follows.
QED.
System JLZ also verifies another very reasonable but less well-known property derived from an axiomatic characterization of entropy maximization [Shore, Johnson 80] . Given default sets ∆ i (i ≤ m) restricted to mutually inconsistent sentences ϕ i , and a further collection ∆ of defaults over boolean combinations of these ϕ i , this postulate requires that the restriction of JLZ[∆ ∪ ∆ 0 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆ m ] to a non-degenerate ϕ i is isomorphic to JLZ[∆ i ∪ {¬ϕ i ⇒ F}]. That is, the JLZ-construction and conditioning commute under suitable conditions. Theorem 8.2 (Subset independence) Let {[ϕ i ] | i ≤ m} be a collection of disjoint propositions, ∆ = {ψ j ⇒ sj ψ j | j ≤ n} a default set where the ψ j , ψ j are boolean combinations of ϕ i , ∆ κπ ϕ i ⇒ F (i ≤ m), and each
If ψ is a boolean combination of ϕ i , we also get We have seen that justifiable constructibility fails for System JLZ and that this is even necessary to ensure structured semantic invariance. However, there is a natural weakening of this requirement which is compatible with SSI and holds for System JLZ. The idea is that, although a JLZ-construction σ can include proper shifts of [ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ] when R σ (ϕ i ∧ ψ i ) + s i < R σ (ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ), these shifts may at least be considered indirectly justifiable as long as [ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ] is subsumed by propositions from directly justifiable shifts. For instance, in the dominance example we may argue that 1[(p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬a) ∨ (q ∧ ¬a)] is indirectly justifiable through 1[p ∧ ¬a] and 1[q ∧ ¬a], which realize the equality constraints
That is, the plausible core of each shifted proposition is covered by shifting propositions of the same rank realizing their relative constraints as equalities. This liberal variant of justifiable constructibility also holds for System JLZ. 
Because of normality maximization and shifting minimization, the plausible core of [ϕ i ∧ ¬ψ i ] must be covered by [ϕ j ∧ ¬ψ j ] with j ∈ I m whose corresponding constraints are realized as equalities (for
A nice feature of normality maximization entailment is that we can reconstruct it as a preferential consequence relation over conditionals, using for instance the argument-wise comparison of κπ-measures as our preference ordering. An interesting question is whether something similar can be done for System JLZ. Here, we have of course to take into account that it verifies only structured semantic invariance. From a practical point of view, and because we do not consider negated conditionals, cumulativity may be the most relevant desideratum. So, let us formulate this principle in the context of structured ranking choice.
Definition 8.5 (Structured ranking choice cumulativity)
A structured ranking choice function F is cumulative iff for all finite ∆, ∆ ,
If we set ∆ |∼ * ∆ iff F(∆) |= sκπ ∆ , then this principle corresponds to left logical equivalence w.r.t. |∼ * and generalizes SSI. For System JLZ, this conditionallevel cumulativity is obviously equivalent with the following requirement.
• For all finite ∆ ∪ {δ},
It is not difficult to show that the principle holds for System J and JLZ.
Theorem 8.6 (Conditional cumulativity for J, JLZ) The structured ranking choice functions F JLZ and F J are cumulative.
. Therefore, the structured constructible κπ-models of ∆ are exactly those of ∆ ∪ {ϕ ⇒ s ψ}, i.e. F J (∆) = F J (∆ ∪ {ϕ ⇒ s ψ}). For System JLZ we have to show that the JLZ-construction gives the same results for ∆ and ∆ ∪ {ϕ ⇒ s ψ}.
Then it is easy to see that both constructions must be identical at ranks below α, with ϕ ⇒ s ψ remaining on the to-do-list and [ϕ ∧ ¬ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ] being pushed towards α. This guarantees that, when constructing rank α, the two corresponding constraints both ask for R(ϕ∧¬ψ) ≥ α, i.e. they are equivalent and [ϕ ∧ ¬ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ] gets its definite rank α. Consequently, we obtain the same result again, and the remaining construction is not affected. On the other hand, conditional cumulativity trivially fails for System JZ and ME at the ranking-level because these approaches violate SSI. For the moment, it is still an open problem whether |∼ * can be reconstructed as a preferential consequence relation based on a suitable pre-order over structured κπ-measures. In particular, we do not know whether |∼ * satisfies loop, the only other remaining popular principle expressible as a positive Horn condition. However, from a practical point of view, this question may be less relevant.
System JLZ is based on a comparatively simple algorithm which should be conceptually easy to grasp. Unfortunately, there is no efficient procedure to build the JLZ-model for arbitrary finite default bases because we may have to check an exponential number of worlds on numerous occasions. What we know is that JLZ-entailment is in PSPACE. In fact, taking a look at the construction procedure and the local shifting theorem, we see that polynomial space is sufficient to keep track of the actual construction stage and to compute the relevant minima or maxima. Currently, we do not yet have any empirical results concerning the practical exploitability of System JLZ. However, right now, System JLZ is ready to provide a gold standard or reference mark for the evaluation of other default formalisms and their trade-offs.
Some comparisons
To complete our presentation of System JLZ, we are now going to investigate its relationship with competing accounts. Here we want to focus on the most powerful proposals, namely semantic-based conditional approaches exploiting sophisticated ranking or prioritization procedures. They are of particular interest insofar as they verify the rationality postulates for nonmonotonic inference as well as the basic inheritance desiderata for default reasoning. Roughly speaking, we may distinguish four categories: pure prioritized accounts, like conditional entailment [Geffner, Pearl 92] , prioritized accounts with weights, like lexicographic closure [Lehmann 95 ] and LCD-inference [Benferhat et al. 00 ], quasi-probabilistic accounts, like System JLZ, and probabilistic accounts, like those based on entropy maximization [Goldszmidt et al. 93, Weydert 95] . Our discussion will concentrate on the most prominent or relevant representatives of these inference classes.
Let us start with conditional entailment (CE). This approach is based on an intricate but well-designed prioritization mechanism which was meant to overcome some drawbacks of System Z, like missing inheritance and excessive speculativity. A first difference with System JLZ is that CE fails to verify rational monotony. However, this may not be a bug but a feature because it is a direct consequence of CE's robustness, i.e. its reluctance for ad hoc decisions and conclusions from shaky evidence. For instance, unlike System JLZ but in accordance with System J, CE does not validate
Unfortunately, CE also fails to sanction very reasonable patterns backed by System JLZ. For instance, CE violates defeasible specificity if we replace the default a ⇒ m by the two defaults f a ⇒ m, ma ⇒ m (fa: woman, ma: man) [Benferhat et al. 00] . On the other hand, in our anti-prioritization example CE explicitly supports an undesirable conclusion, ¬a. The basic problem here is that CE always prefers the violation of several defaults of lower priority to the falsification of any default of higher priority. But the resulting differentiation of double exceptionality looks highly artificial. Similar problems arise for all those accounts which naively exploit the Z-stratification, like Lehmann's lexicographic closure [Lehmann 95] . A major characteristic of System JLZ is that it applies its Z-like methodology dynamically, level by level, taking into account all the information available at the given construction stage.
Among the major non-probabilistic approaches, which are all ⊆-incomparable with JLZ-entailment, the strongest competitor may be LCD-inference [Benferhat et al. 00] . It was originally developed in the context of nonstandard belief function theory, but it can easily be translated into our construction framework. The LCD inference strategy is very interesting because, from our perspective, it tries to implement a kind of global -as opposed to local -shifting minimization in a robust way, i.e. without too many commitments concerning the ranking values. This guarantees a high degree of ambiguity preservation, although it blocks rational monotony. In particular, LCD sanctions anti-prioritization and exception analogies. A less attractive property is the failure of evidence comparison. Furthermore, we get neither redundancy nor the big birds hammer, i.e. no consequent information minimization. Of particular interest is the second pattern of complex specificity I. Here LCD concludes q, the major classical proposals prefer ¬q, and JLZ stays ambiguous, which appears to be the most reasonable stance. Another, more fundamental problem is the asymmetric handling of different types of second-degree exceptions. Let
Intuitively, a, b, and p ∧ q (p, q are independent) represent similar levels of double exceptionality. From the perspective of a, this similarity holds in particular between b and p ∧ q. However, whereas LCD sanctions {a ∨ a } |∼ ∆ ¬a and {b ∨ a } |∼ ∆ ¬a , it rejects {(p ∧ q) ∨ a } |∼ ∆ ¬a , which is rather strange. Even worse, we can enforce this relationship just by adding an intuitively irrelevant default, like (p ∧ q) ∨ r ⇒ ¬r. Interestingly, this non-robust behaviour is linked to the use of partial Z-like stratifications.
The connections between J, JZ, and JLZ have already been dicussed before. Descriptions and comparisons of other constructible default formalisms can be found in our earlier papers. A partial generalization of our constructibility perspective, also inspired by probabilistic considerations, has been proposed in . The idea is to allow arbitrary up-and downwards shifting -by any rational amount -of [ϕ ∧ ¬ψ] and [ϕ ∧ ψ] for ϕ ⇒ s ψ ∈ ∆. Following other authors, Kern-Isberner uses ranking measures with integer values. This, however, is a strong restriction which artificially obstructs information minimization. Fortunately, the discreteness requirement can easily be dropped. Kern-Isberner introduces c-entailment, which basically generalizes System J to her broader notion of constructibility. Although this may be an interesting starting point for the design of more powerful approaches, it is important to note that these additional degrees of freedom can also cause some serious problems. For instance, c-entailment fails to validate the following inoffensive variants of exceptional inheritance.
In both examples, the downwards shifting of the exceptional resp. non-exceptional area ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is responsible. Even if generalized constructibility could be quite relevant for conditional revision, it is not clear whether it offers any essential advantages in the context of standard default reasoning.
Entropy maximization (ME) is a well-justified probabilistic inference mechanism, characterizable by intuitive desiderata [Shore, Johnson 80, Paris, Vencovska 90] , which works by focusing on those models with the least information content. There have been several attempts to exploit ME for default reasoning, notably ME for ε-parametrized probability distributions [Goldszmidt et al. 93] and variants thereof [Bourne, Parsons 99] , generalized ε-probability functions [Hill, Paris 03] , the random worlds account [Bacchus et al. 97] , and ME for nonarchimedean probability measures [Weydert 95, 98] , which offers some technical advantages. The basic idea here is to translate a given default knowledge base ∆ = {ϕ i ⇒ si ψ i | i ≤ n} into a set of conditional probability constraints of the form ∆ P I = {P (¬ψ i |ϕ i ) ∈ I i | i ≤ n} where each {0} ⊆ I i ⊂ [0, 1] is an infinitesimal segment of a nonstandard model of the reals with exponentiation. The most common interpretation of I i is [0, ε si ] for an arbitrary but fixed infinitesimal ε and a standard positive real s i , so that we may set ∆ P I = ∆ P ε . This defines a closed convex set of constraints for nonstandard probability measures. If we assume a finite B, it guarantees the existence of a unique ME-solution M E(∆ P ε ). We can now translate back this distinguished probability model into a canonical κπ-model R ∆ me of ∆ by setting • R ∆ me (A) = R M E(∆ P ε ) (A) = re(log ε (M E(∆ P ε )(A))). It follows from the model theory of real exponential fields [van den Dries et al. 94] that R ∆ me is independent from the choice of the infinitesimal ε and therefore welldefined. The canonical ME-based default entailment notion is then given by
• κπ-ME: Σ |∼ M E ∆ ψ iff R ∆ me (¬ψ| Σ) > 0. Because our current goal is to compare System JLZ with accounts of similar strength, we are not going to discuss the more robust variants of ME-entailment [Bacchus et al. 97, Weydert 95, 98] , which assume partially specified bounds and violate rational monotony. One problem with ME-entailment is that there is currently no algorithm for computing the canonical κπ-ME-model, there are only some partial results. Thus, [Goldszmidt et al. 93] have proposed System Z * , which is based on a construction procedure for κ-measures. Unfortunately, it produces the κπ-ME-model only for minimal core sets, i.e. finite default sets inducing logically irredundant material implications. For this class of examples, System JLZ agrees with ME-entailment. But this doesn't even include simple default collections like ∆ = {T ⇒ b, a ⇒ ¬b, a ∧ a ⇒ b}. Bourne and Parsons [99] present an extension of this result which also considers variable-strength defaults and -in fact -focuses on those default bases with a unique justifiably constructible model. But this excludes a broad class of scenarios (e.g. the big birds runner). It also invites ad hoc choices from the user to enforce this precondition, like arbitrarily declaring defaults as redundant and dropping them, or using strengths not sanctioned by the initial knowledege representation, mainly for technical reasons. Because System JLZ only validates weak justifiable constructibility, as opposed to System JZ, its behaviour differs even in the focus area.
But there are also more serious theoretical issues. In fact, System JLZ and JZ often fit our qualitative intuitions much better than ME, which is haunted by its quantitative specification. The following example provides a very simple illustration of this divergence.
• ∆ = {T ⇒ a, T ⇒ b, T ⇒ a ∧ b}. With two possible minimal explanations for the exceptionality of ¬a ∨ ¬b, namely {T ⇒ a, T ⇒ b} and {T ⇒ a ∧ b}, System JLZ stays neutral and gives them equal weight. However, if we translate these defaults by exact conditional probability constraints, the symmetry is broken. Whereas the first two constraints are still subsumed by the third one, it doesn't work the other way around. Consequently, we can drop the first two, which produces the above result. This problem is linked to the sensitivity of |∼ M E to small changes -within the same order of magnitude -of the infinitesimal conditional probability bounds. Clearly, this is somehow at odds with the qualitative perspective and the inherent vagueness of default statements. Note that the use of intervals I i closed under addition prevents canonicity and invalidates rational monotony.
A major drawback is the resulting representation dependence of ME-entailment. This problem, which doesn't arise for the constructibility semantics, can only be solved by taking into account the boolean structure induced by the [ϕ ∧ ¬ψ] and [ϕ ∧ ψ] extracted from ϕ ⇒ s ψ ∈ ∆. Otherwise, changing the propositional granularity may change the upper bounds for some shiftable propositions. Like System JZ, ME-entailment also doesn't satisfy structured logical invariance, let alone structured cumulativity. Perhaps we could attack these weaknesses by a more intelligent, context-dependent choice of the constraint bounds, but this would go beyond the ME-paradigm and require considerations similar to those motivating our canonical ranking constructions. The other alternative would be to drop rational monotony and to consider more robust variants which are less affected by the gap between the qualitative and the quantitative world. As far as default reasoning is concerned, the direct implementation of basic ideas from the minimum information philosophy within the ranking framework appears to be more promising than a naive transfer of probabilistic inference methods.
Conclusions and perspectives
So, what did we achieve and what remains to be done? First, we have discussed the major desiderata for default inference and presented a general semantic framework for default reasoning based on distinguished κπ-measures. Motivated by the exceptional inheritance paradox, we have introduced on top of this the epistemic construction paradigm, which offers simple and powerful default entailment notions. It also suggests a structured semantics for default conditionals which allows us to exploit implicit information encoded in the structure of a default knowledge base. Exploiting intuitive minimal construction principles, we have specified a conceptually transparent canonical ranking construction procedure in the tradition of System Z. It defines a very well-behaved quasiprobabilistic default inference concept for graded default knowledge, System JLZ. This approach implements five major ideas -the epistemic shifting philosophy, local shifting minimzation, normality maximization, rational monotony w.r.t. L, and structured cumulativity w.r.t. L(⇒). System JLZ also reflects the information minimization strategy -it even turns out to be more practical and less sensitive to knowledge modeling than ME at the ranking level. Furthermore, System JLZ satisfies the relevant inheritance (anti-)patterns and exhibits better invariance properties than its relative System JZ.
Like every default formalism based on canonical ranking constructions, System JLZ is of course highly speculative. It may therefore be useful to investigate robust alternatives based on the same principles. One possibility would be to consider all the weakly justifiable constructible models, but this approach would be computationally quite expensive. Another issue, which has also hardly been addressed in the general literature, is the extension of System JLZ to conditional default quantifiers. Originally, the constructibility semantics was inspired by belief revision techniques. But first results indicate that this may also work the other way around, i.e. we may exploit these construction procedures for designing well-behaved iterated revision formalisms with solid semantic foundations. Similarly, it may be of interest to lift the JLZ-strategy, or other formal tools developed within the ranking framework, to the probabilistic level and to use them to suggest new quantitative inference methods.
